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Contracts

Contracts on Arc mainnet, chain 5042. The first three were deployed 23 September 2026, CovenProbe on 14 October 2026.

Contract Address
CovenRouter 0x5b86f1e5d95eFe358004B4484bF0a8C386c419a8
CovenLens 0x098Bb65C8aBBfF80c91e2A72A4A1439D31770fed
CovenSessionFactory 0xC7d8306A78e91d0C4fA0e5Ad6D1278A73767b057
CovenProbe 0x179606809c8611BebFAC04357f0B4E0Fb8b6479E
CovenArb (deprecated) 0xFFAEFEA08cD27e9f0CA6A7e7ce3047e924cb663e

CovenRouter executes swaps and holds the settings. CovenLens prices routes and stores nothing; apps call it read-only. CovenSessionFactory creates the per-user session contracts the MCP write path uses. CovenProbe runs atomic arbitrage and is independent of the other three. CovenArb is its deprecated predecessor.

@covennetwork/core exports the router, lens, session factory and CovenArb as COVEN_ROUTER, COVEN_LENS, COVEN_SESSION_FACTORY and COVEN_ARB, and the SDK uses them by default. @covennetwork/arb exports COVEN_PROBE. You should not need to paste an address anywhere.

The router, lens, session factory and CovenArb were reviewed in September 2026 and the findings were fixed before deployment. See the security assessment. CovenProbe has not had an external review yet.

An earlier router and lens pair, deployed 19 September 2026 at 0xA13b8d54… and 0xc041C074…, is still on chain and still works, but it predates the review and should not be used. Nothing migrates automatically; point your integration at the addresses above.

  • The router holds no funds between transactions, apart from fees that could not be paid out.
  • It can only pull tokens from whoever called it, so an approval given to it cannot be spent by anyone else.
  • The SDK approves the exact swap amount rather than an unlimited allowance.
  • Approvals the router gives Uniswap and CCTP cover one call and are cleared afterwards.
  • Every swap checks a minimum output after fees.
  • A pool that cannot fill the whole amount causes a revert instead of a partial fill.
  • None of the contracts can be upgraded.

The owner is a Safe multisig. It can:

  • change the platform fee, within the 1% cap
  • change the address that receives fees
  • allow or remove v4 hooks and hook templates
  • pause and unpause swaps
  • set the guardian
  • recover tokens sent to the router by mistake, except fees owed to someone else

None of that reaches a user’s wallet. The worst a compromised owner could do is raise the fee to 1%, redirect fee income, or allow a hostile hook, and a hostile hook can take at most what a trader’s own slippage setting permits.

Ownership transfers happen in two steps, and ownership cannot be renounced.

The guardian can pause swaps but cannot unpause them. A pause stops new swaps and touches nobody’s funds.

The fee recipient is a different address from the owner on purpose. Arc USDC can be frozen by its issuer, and if one address were both, a freeze would take out the fee income and the key that would rotate it at the same time.

Fees are paid during the swap. If a payment fails, because the recipient has been frozen for instance, the amount is credited to that recipient instead of reverting, and they withdraw it later with claimFees. A fee recipient who cannot receive a token therefore cannot stop anyone else from trading. Credited fees are reserved: the owner’s recovery function can only take what is left over.

A v4 pool can attach a hook, and a hook with swap permissions can change what a trader receives. Coven routes through such a pool only when the owner has allowed the hook, either individually or through a template that matches a launchpad’s hook code.

Dynamic-fee pools need the same approval even when their hook holds no swap permissions, because the hook can still move the pool’s fee, up to 100%, at any moment. Only a pool with a static fee and a hook that cannot intervene in a swap routes without a check.

A template masks the few constants a launchpad varies per token and requires everything else to match byte for byte. Each masked position covers exactly the bytes its constant occupies, and registration walks the reference contract’s bytecode and refuses any mask that would reach into executable code. A template also records the hook’s permission bits, so identical code deployed at an address with different permissions is treated as a different hook and is not admitted.

Masking a constant means a matching hook may set it to anything. Registering a template is a decision about those values as much as about the code.

Contract Address
USDC 0x3600000000000000000000000000000000000000
Uniswap v3 factory 0xf0db7b58379503491d857dB50AC9ece64c653918
Uniswap SwapRouter02 0x53BF6B0684Ec7eF91e1387Da3D1a1769bC5A6F77
Uniswap v4 PoolManager 0x8366a39CC670B4001A1121B8F6A443A643e40951
CCTP TokenMessengerV2 0x28b5a0e9C621a5BadaA536219b3a228C8168cf5d

CovenSession bounds an agent’s spending on chain for the MCP write path. Every session is created through CovenSessionFactory, which pins the canonical router and lens so a lookalike cannot pass, and owns each session to whoever sent the creating transaction. A session trades only pairs with USDC on one side, so its caps stay measurable; it cannot trade token to token. See sessions.

CovenProbe runs atomic arbitrage. It is permissionless, holds no funds between transactions, and keeps 10% of realized profit. It never touches CovenRouter. CovenArb, its predecessor, is deprecated: it still works but the arbitrage bot no longer uses it. See the arbitrage contract.